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TRUSTS-ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS-INSTRUMENT,

TESTAMENTARY IN

CHARACTER-Smith, et at. Vs. Simmons, as Administrator-No.
14009-Decided September 21, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Holland.
This was an action for recovery of two $1,000 liberty loan bonds

brought by the administrator of the estate of Eliza A. Wade. Judgment below was for plaintiff. The deceased, in her lifetime, placed
three $1,000 liberty loan bonds with the Colorado Springs National
Bank, accompanied by a letter of instructions to collect and pay her the
interest and in the event of her death to deliver the bonds to three
different parties. She later withdrew one of the bonds and left the two
remaining bonds with a new similar letter of instructions, except *they
were to be delivered to two people in the event of her death.
1. The effect to be given the written instrument is to be determined from its face and the circumstances relating to its execution
and delivery as disclosed by the evidence.
2. The written words as well as Mrs. Wade's acts in retaining
control of the bonds by withdrawing one, clearly supports the interpretation that she had not ceased to be the owner and in control of the
bonds and that she retained the legal right thereto and did not part
with such title or interest at the time of her written declaration.
3.
To create a valid express trust, it was necessary that she do
all things that could be done to pass the legal title by the transfer to
the bank. Had the instrument been sufficient in form to create a valid
trust, it could not have been revoked at her will. The fact that she
requested and received part of the bonds from the bank under an instrument identical with the substituted one, demonstrates that she did not
consider that she had divested herself of the title or control of the
property.
4. Whatever might have been attempted as a gift to be effective
at her death, was so imperfectly performed as to defeat such effect.
5.
Not having disposed of the bonds during her lifetime, they
became a part of her estate at her death.-Judamentaffirmed.
Mr. Justice Bouck dissents. Mr. Justice Young not participating.
SUMMONS-SERVICE

ON CORPORATION -

SUFFICIENCY -

SETTING

ASIDE JUDGMENT-Younge vs. Sutton-No. 13750-Decided
September 21, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.

Sutton instituted this action to clear the title to certain real estate
which had been sold under execution upon a judgment obtained by
Younge against the Pueblo Industrial Company, a holding corporation
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He claimed title by virtue of an unrecorded
for Sutton and family.
deed, and attacked the judgment against the Pueblo Industrial Company on the ground of defective service of summons, alleging also that
Younge, the judgment creditor, knew that Sutton was the owner
and in posession, and that the levy, execution and sale, was with full
knowledge of these facts. Plaintiff prevailed below.
1. Service of summons made upon the assistant secretary of a
corporation, where there is no secretary, and where it further appears
that the assistant secretary signed annual reports filed in the office of
the Secretary of State and it further appeared that such assistant secretary was in charge of the office of the corporation, such person is a

general agent of the corporation so far as the service of process is concerned, especially where the corporation has immediate notice of such
service and recognizes the service without complaint or protest within
the time afforded therefor.
2. Where the plaintiff claimed title by an unrecorded deed it was
the plaintiff's duty to disclose all knowledge immediately after the
commencement of the suit by Younge against the corporation which
resulted in the judgment, execution, sale and deed. There was nothing
inconsistent with the possession by Sutton, after he claimed the deed
to him was delivered but not recorded, to the possession which he
enjoyed of the real estate as the vice president of a family corporation
owning the real estate. Furthermore, the plaintiff, as an officer of the
corporation, was a party to the annual report made to the Secretary of
State wherein the real estate was represented to the public as being
owned by the corporation subsequent to the time that Sutton claimed
title under an unrecorded deed. Under the circumstances Younge was
a bona fidepurchaser of the real estate at the execution sale without
notice of the claims now asserted by Sutton and his title is superior to
that claimed by Sutton through the unrecorded deed.-Judgment reversed.

CRIMINAL LAW-CROSS-EXAMINING DEFENDANT WITH REFERENCE
TO INDEPENDENT CRiME-ERROR.-Munfrada et al. u The

People-No. 13,943-Decided August 10, 1936--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Butler.
Munfrada and one other were convicted of larceny of seed potatoes.

The district attorney, over objections of defendant, was permitted to
cross-examine Munfrada with reference to the alleged theft of automo-

bile tires from the Speedway garage.
1. Evidence is not admissible which shows, or tends to show,
that the accused has committed a crime wholly independent of the
offense for which he is on trial.
2. Such cross-examination was improper and prejudicial to both
defendants.-Judgment reversed.
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DEEDS---SETTING ASIDE FOR MENTAL INCAPACITY TO EXECUTESUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE-QUALIFICATIONS OF JURORS-

The Seventh Day Adventist Association, et at. vs. UnderwoodNo. 13674Decided July 20, 1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Hilliard.
In an action to recover real property defendant in error prevailed
before a jury and had judgment setting aside certain conveyances of
real estate made in 1929 on the ground that the deceased lacked mental
capacity to make, acknowledge and deliver the conveyances.
1. The question of the mental capacity of the grantor was
properly submitted to the jury upon conflicting evidence and there was
sufficient evidence to sustain the finding of the jury.
2. Where it appears that three of the jurors were also jurors
on a previous case involving the mental capacity of the same grantor
but that in the examination of the jury on voir dire the counsel for
plaintiff in error failed to ask the jurors if they had served on a previous
case involving the question of mental capacity of the same grantor,
this shows a lack of diligence on the part of the complaining party,
which amounts to a waiver.

3. Parties have the right to interrogate persons who are called
to sit as jurors for the purpose of ascertaining their qualifications before
they are sworn, and if this is not done the right to challenge is waived.
-- Judgment affirmed.

MINES AND MINING-LIABILITY OF MILLING COMPANY ON BOND
FOR FAILURE TO PAY PURCHASE PRICE OF ORE-Robinson vs.

The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company-No. 13786-Decided July 27, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
Robinson sued the Aetna Company to recover on a bond given
by the Chain O'Mines, a corporation, as required by Section 3366,
Compiled Laws 1921.
Robinson's assignors sold ore to Chain 0'Mines at an agreed price and upon failure to pay the agreed price the
suit was brought, judgment obtained and after execution was returned
wholly unsatisfied Robinson sued the Aetna Company on the bond.
1. The bond required under Section 3366, Compiled Laws of
1921, to be given by milling and ore treating companies, is conditioned
that the obligor will not violate any law relating to such business.
2.
No provision of the act of 1915 was violated.
3.
The penalty provided by Section 3366, Compiled Laws of
1921, provides for fine and imprisonment for neglect or refusal to account for all the proceeds to the owner of the ore.
4. This penalty statute is criminal in its nature and does not
cover a case of failure to pay the price for the purchase of ore, but is
limited to cases for failure to account for the proceeds of ore delivered
for treatment.
5.
A mere violation of the common law duty to pay the purchase price does not come within the terms of Section 3366, Compiled
Laws of 1921, as that section only refers to statutory law relating to
such business.-Judgment affirmed.

